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Abstract. We give diagrammatic tools to reason about information flow
within encrypted communication. In particular, we are interested in de-
ducing where information flow (communication or otherwise) has taken
place, and fully accounting for all possible paths.
The core mathematical concept is using a single categorical diagram to
model the underlying mathematics, the epistemic knowledge of the par-
ticipants, and (implicitly) the potential or actual communication between
participants.A key part of this is a ‘correctness’ or ‘consistency’ crite-
rion that ensures we accurately & fully account for the distinct routes by
which information may come to be known (i.e. communication and / or
calculation).
We demonstrate how this formalism may be applied to answer questions
about communication scenarios where we have the partial information-
about the participants and their interactions. Similarly, we show how to
analyse the consequences of changes to protocols or communications, and
to enumerate the distinct orders in which events may have occurred.
We use various forms of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as an illustration
of these techniques. However, they are entirely general; we illustrate in an
appendix how other protocols from non-commutative cryptography may be
analysed in the same manner.
1 Introduction
This paper is about using categorical diagrams to study (or rather, reconstruct)
the flow of information in scenarios involving encrypted communication; it is
not about the difficulty or otherwise of solving mathematical problems on which
security is based.
1.1 Key aims
The main aim of this paper is to introduce tools, based on diagrammatic repre-
sentations, to ensure that we have fully accounted for information flow and routes
to calculating values in communication generally, and cryptographic protocols
specifically. Of course, we do not expect to find within the cryptographic liter-
ature examples of protocols where the designers have failed to do this! Rather,
we use pre-existing protocols (in particular various forms of Diffie-Hellman key
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exchange, as a particularly well-understood example) in order to motivated and
test our tools.
The utility comes when we use such techniques to reason about incomplete,
rather than complete, descriptions of encrypted communication. We wish to anal-
yse the situation where – for example – one participant becomes aware of some
additional information (say, a secret key). Can we deduce, in a systematic way,
the additional routes to calculating values that this implies? This is considered
in Section 6.3.
Alternatively, we wish to work backwards – we know that some private infor-
mation has become more widely known, but no single individual is in a position
to have shared this. Can we fully account for all possible routes by which this
information became known? This is considered in Section 7.
1.2 Tools used
Our starting point is the common category-theoretic technique of expressing
algebraic identities via commuting diagrams. Drawing such diagrams for the
algebra behind cryptographic protocols makes their structure clear (see, for ex-
ample [15]), and gives a clear representation of the underlying mathematics; this
paper also extends such diagrams to include the participants, and what they
come to know in the course of the protocol.
Mathematically, we do this by moving beyond commuting diagrams, and
recovering both the information flow between participants, and distinct routes
by which significant values may be computed, as 2-categorical structure.
Based on this, we give a ‘correctness’ criterion that ensures that potential or
actual information flow within the diagram is modelled correctly – i.e. nothing
has been ‘left out’ and we have not overlooked any route by which a participant
may come to know some information.
2 Bipartite Diffie-Hellman, diagramatically
We use, as illustration, the basic bipartite D-H protocol [5,13]; the underlying
algebra, communications, and knowledge of participants are we summarised in
Table 1.
The tabular presentation simply distinguishes public and private informa-
tion; by contrast, a fine-grained description of the knowledge of the participants
(Alice, Bob, and some putative evesdropper1 Eve) is given in lattice form, by
‘tagging’ each algebraic element by a member of the power set lattice 2{A,B,E}
of participants.
1 Although it is standard to assume that Eve is an adversary to Alice and Bob, the
tools themselves take a more agnostic approach. Our aim is to model (or rather,
reconstruct) information flow generally; although we are naturally more concerned
about information flow to Eve, the mathematical models themselves treat her equally
to the other participants.
Table 1. A concise summary of D-H key exchange
Alice Public Bob
Public prime p
Public root g ∈ Zp
Selects private Selects private
a ∈ Zp b ∈ Zp
Computes ga
Announces ga
//
Announces gb
oo Computes gb
Computes:
(
gb
)a
Computes: (ga)b
By elementary arithmetic, these are equal.(
gb
)a
= gab = (ga)b
Alice, Bob, Eve
g, ga, gb
Alice & Bob
gab
Alice
a
Bob
b
Nobody
ab
2.1 Expressing algebraic identities diagrammatically
A core category-theoretic practice is giving identities as commuting diagrams.
Definition 1. A diagram over a category C is simply a directed graph with
nodes labeled by objects. Each edge is labeled by an arrow whose source / target
is given by the labels on the initial / final nodes. A diagram commutes when
the composites along all paths with the same starting / finishing node are equal.
Although the concept is simple, commuting diagrams provide a very efficient
and visual way to express algebraic identities. In Figure 1 we express the identies
from Table 1 as a commuting diagram over the following category:
Definition 2. Given prime p ∈ N, we define the category DHp to have two
objects: a singleton object {∗} and the set Zp = {0, . . . , p− 1}.
For all x = 0, . . . , p− 1, we have the following arrows:
– The selection arrows [x] : {∗} → Zp, defined by [x](∗) = x ∈ Zp.
– The modular exponentiation arrows ( )x : Zp → Zp, defined in the usual
arithmetic manner.
Remark 1 (Interpretation). The arrows of the above category should be though
of as operations that may reliably be performed by participants. When we say
that “Bob knows gab”, we mean that Bob is able to select gab from the whole of
Zp. This is the interpretation of the ‘selection arrows’.
2.2 Combining algebraic & epistemic data
We now combine the algebraic and epistemic aspects of the D-H protocol into a
single categorical diagram (Figure 2), by ‘tagging’ each arrow by the subset of
participants that are able to perform that operation.
By treating 2{A,B,E} as a monoid with composition given by intersection
we consider Figure 2 to be a categorical diagram over the product category
Fig. 1. Bipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange
ZP
( )b
$$
( )a
zz
Zp
( )b
$$
{∗}
[g]
OO
[gb] //[ga]oo
[gab]

Zp
( )a
zz
Zp
Fig. 2. The Algebraic-Epistemic diagram for Diffie-Hellman key exchange
ZP
( )b,{B}
$$
( )a,{A}
zz
Zp
( )b,{B}
$$
{∗}
[g],{A,B,E}
OO
[gb],{A,B,E} //[ga],{A,B,E}oo
[gab],{A,B}

Zp
( )a,{A}
zz
Zp
DHp×2{A,B,E}. Note that this categorical diagram fails to commute. We discuss
the significance of this in Section 3 below, but first provide some much-needed
clarification on what, precisely, is being modeled by these diagrams.
2.3 What is being modeled by A-E diagrams?
The interpretation of the epistemic tags in an A-E is that an algebraic compo-
nent (e.g. a private key, public message, shared secret, etc.) is labeled by some
representation of ‘who knows this value’. What has not been included is any
explicit representation of how or when they came to know this. There is there-
fore no in-built notion of ‘event’, ‘message’, ‘time-ordering’, ‘causality’ or even
‘communication’.
Rather, the information in the diagram simply tells us that a given partic-
ipant became aware of a given value at some point. It may be seen as a retro-
spective view of some communication protocol. Once the process has completed,
who has become aware of what?
This is intentional, and by design. One aim is to demonstrate how, given
this restricted information, we may nevertheless reconstruct possible scenarios
of how this state of affairs may have arisen (via communications between par-
ticipants, and participants using the result of these communications to calculate
new values).
For a well-designed cryptographic protocol, we expect this to be unique, or
at least unique up to some inessential re-ordering of events (such as well-known
variations of the steps in tri-partite Diffie-Hellman key exchange of Section 5).
Of more interest is the situation where there is some ambiguity, or sim-
ply where something has gone wrong! We may wish account for all routes by
which some information became public knowledge (Section 7), or to analyse the
consequences of some individual having more a priori knowledge than we had
anticipated (Section 6.3).
3 Information flow as failure of commutativity
The failure of commutativity in Figure 2 is obvious. Our claim is that this is
a feature rather than a bug: non-trivial information flow becomes obvious in
this graphical form. Precisely, the points at which commutativity fails are those
where either 1/ a public announcement has taken place, or 2/ there exists more
than one route to calculating the same result.
Fig. 3. Announcements as failure of commutativity in D-H key exchange
Alice’s
announcement
ZP
( )b,{B}
&&
( )a,{A}
xx
 
Bob’s
announcement
Zp {∗}
[g],{A,B,E}
OO
[gb],{A,B,E} //[ga],{A,B,E}oo Zp
Consider the subdiagram of Figure 2 given in Figure 3. This fails to commute
because (( )a, {A}) ([g], {A,B,E}) = ([ga] , {A}) 6= ([ga] , {A,B,E}). Similarly,(
( )b, {B}) ([g], {A,B,E}) = ([gb] , {B}) 6= ([gb] , {A,B,E}).
The underlying cause in both cases is the public announcements: we would
see the label ([ga] , {A}) = (( )a, {A}) ([g], {A,B,E}) in the case where Al-
ice had raised the publicly known root to her secret key, but kept the result
to herself. Similarly, we see an edge labeled by
([
gb
]
, {A,B,E}), rather than([
gb
]
, {B}) = (( )b, {B}) ([g], {A,B,E}) because Bob has publicly shared the
result of his computation.
Communication between participants clearly causes failure of commutativity;
however, there is another significant reason why a diagram may fail to commute.
Fig. 4. Failure of commutativity via distinct paths to the same result
Zp
( )b,{B}
%%
&.
{∗} [gb],{A,B,E} //[ga],{A,B,E}oo
[gab],{A,B}

Zp
( )a,{A}
yy
px
Bob’s
computation
Zp Alice’s
computation
Figure 4 gives another subdiagram of Figure 2 that also fails to commute, since(
( )b, {B}) ([ga], {A,B,E}) = ([gab], {B}) 6= ([gab], {A,B}). In a similar way,
(( )a, {A}) ([gb], {A,B,E}) = ([gab], {A}) 6= ([gab], {A,B}).
However, no announcements or sharing of information have taken place in
this part of the protocol. Rather commutativity fails because Alice and Bob have
separately arrived at the same information (i.e. their shared secret gab) via two
distinct paths.
The fact that they both know it (and only they know it) is accounted for by
the fact that the label on shared secret is the join of the labels of the two paths
with the same source and target.
4 Algebraic-Epistemic diagrams, and a correctness
condition
The above considerations apply generally, and motivate the following definitions:
Definition 3. We define the Algebraic-Epistemic or A-E diagram for a
communication protocol or scenario to be a categorical diagram giving a complete
representation of thealgebraic components, together with tags representing who
becomes aware of what information.
Remark 2. This paper uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange as illustration because
it is simple and well-understood. We emphasise that these techniques are general;
we may draw similar diagrams for other communication protocols or scenarios.
Appendix A gives A-E diagrams for the ‘Commuting Action Key Exchange’
family of protocols from non-commutative cryptography [21], and demonstrates
that the same interpretations and correctness criteria hold.
4.1 A correctness criterion for A-E diagrams
We now introduce a general ‘correctness’ criterion on A-E diagrams. This is
based on partial order enriched categories.
Definition 4. A category C is poset–enriched when each homset C(X,Y ) has
a partial ordering ≤XY compatible with composition:
f ≤XY a ∈ C(X,Y ) and g ≤Y Z b ∈ C(Y,Z) ⇒ gf ≤XZ ba ∈ C(X,Z)
(It is common to omit the object subscripts; these are generally clear from the
context).
Any category may be considered to be enriched over the partial order given by
equality on homsets. The product of two poset-enriched categories is also assumed
to be enriched over the product partial order: (a, b) ≤ (c, d) iff a ≤ c and b ≤ d.
Thus we may assume the category DHp × 2{A,B,E} used in Section 2.2 to be
poset-enriched.
Based on this, we give a general definition on diagrams over poset–enriched
categories that we will claim as a ‘correctness criterion’ for Algebraic-Epistemic
diagrams.
Definition 5. We say that a diagram D over a poset-enriched category C satis-
fies the information flow ordering (IFO) condition, or is an information
flow ordered diagram when:
1. The underlying diagraph of D is acyclic.
2. For any edge e and path p = pk . . . p1 with the same source and target node,
the label on p is ≤ the label on e.
Remark 3 (The general setting). Poset-enriched categories are a very special case
of 2-categories, where as well as objects and arrows between objects, we have
‘higher-level’ notion of 2-morphisms between arrows. We refer to [16] for a good
exposition of the general theory, but this is only relevant for our purposes in
that we have a neat ready-made diagrammatic calculus.
It is standard to draw 2-morphisms in categorical diagrams as “two-cells”; for
our purposes these are simply labeled by the partial order relation, so condition
2. is drawn as follows:
e //
p1
 //
pk
OO
≤
KS
An immediate consequence of this condition is that any pair of edges with the
same source and target nodes have the same label. We therefore include the
assumption there is at most one edge with a given source / target.
Remark 4 (The IFO condition as a correctness criterion). The IFO condition is
proposed as a correctness criterion for Algebraic-Epistemic diagrams generally.
This ‘correctness’ is simply about about accurately accounting for 1/ information
flow between participants, and 2/ what this enables them to calculate. Our claim
is that if we find that the IFO condition is not satisfied, we have failed to account
for either 1/ or 2/. Further, we may often recover this additional information in
a systematic and easily automated manner.
4.2 Justifying the IFO condition
The prescription for drawing A-E diagrams is entirely generic. Diagrams are
drawn over a category of the form C ×L, where C is the algebraic setting for the
protocol, and L is a meet-semilattice (generally the powerset-lattice 2P of the
participants in the protocol). We assume C to be poset-enriched over the equality
relation, so the product category C × 2P is then enriched via the product partial
ordering.
The Algebraic-Epistemic diagram D for a protocol is a diagram over this
category. The projection onto the first component pi1 (D) is an acyclic commuting
diagram over C that expresses the relationships between operations performed
by participants in the protocol. By construction, this commutes, and therefore
trivially satisfies the IFO condition. The additional lattice labels in D itself are
‘tags’ giving the subset of participants that are able to perform the operation
on that edge.
Based on this generic description, the interpretation of the IFO condition is
straightforward. Consider (a fragment of) the A-E diagram for some protocol
consisting of one edge and one path between nodes H and K, as follows:
• a2,P2 // . . . an−1,Pn−1 // •
an,Pn

H
a1,P1
OO
b,Q
// K
The IFO condition in this simple case states that
∧n
j=1 Pj ≤ Q. Given our
interpretation, the IFO condition is an axiomatisation of the triviality that any
individual who is able to perform each of the operations a1, . . . , an is also able
to perform their composite anan−1 . . . a1.
Conversely, consider some diagram consisting of a single edge from node H
to node K, and multiple paths {Π1, . . . Πn}with the same source and target,
where the meet of the labels along Πk is denoted Rk, as follows:
H b,Q //
b,R1

b,R2
!!b,Rn
,, K
...
The interpretation of the IFO condition is again straightforward. Every member
of R1, R2, . . . , Rn is able to perform b; thus Rj ≤ Q for all j = 1..n. Using the
additional lattice operations of 2P we may also write this as
∨n
j=1Rj ≤ Q.
However, the possibility that additional communication / announcements have
also taken place prevents us from writing
∨n
j=1Rj = Q; indeed, failure of this
condition is a clear signal that additional communication has taken place.
Remark 5 (The IFO condition and deadlock-freeness). A further consequence of
the IFO condition is deadlock-freeness; for example, it rules out the situation
where Alice is waiting for a communication from Bob before she may continue,
whilst simultaneously, Bob is waiting for a communication from Alice before he
may take his next step.
This is not ruled out by the acyclicity of the underlying graph; communication
appears as arrows between the edges of this graph (the partial order relations,
drawn as 2-cells) – it is these that we need to ensure do not form closed loops.
Fortunately, this follows for free from the IFO condition; deadlock would
appear as a ‘closed loop’ of inequalities of distinct labels on edges, such as a < b,
b < c, and c < a. However, the anti-symmetry axiom x ≤ y & y ≤ x ⇒ x = y
for partial orders then implies that a = b = c. This contradicts the assumption
that a, b and c are distinct labels!
5 Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange
We now use diagrammatic methods to compare and contrast two approaches
to tripartite secret sharing based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Multi-partite
generalisations of Diffie-Hellman key exchange are well-established (see, for ex-
ample, [12]). We consider the case where three participants construct a single
shared secret, and where each pair of the three participants has a distinct shared
secret. We refer to these as
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman and
(
3
2
)
Diffie-Hellman respec-
tively.
They are of course special cases of the situation where there are n partic-
ipants, and each subset of k participants constructs a distinct shared secret –
what we refer to as the general
(
n
k
)
Diffie-Hellman protocol. This, including its
diagrammatics, is considered in Appendix C.
Definition 6 (
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman key exchange). Let us assume partici-
pants {Alice,Bob, Carol, Eve} where Eve is the evesdropper, and Alice, Bob,
and Carol will construct a mutual shared secret. Alice, Bob and Carol choose
private keys a, b, c ∈ Zp respectively, and their shared secret gabc = gbca = gcab
is constructed as follows:
1. Alice computes ga and communicates the result to Bob.
2. Bob computes gb and communicates the result to Carol.
3. Carol computes gc and communicates the result to Alice.
4. Alice computes (gc)
a
= gca and communicates the result to Bob.
5. Bob computes (ga)
b
= gab and communicates the result to Carol.
6. Carol computes
(
gb
)c
= gbc and communicates the result to Alice.
7. Alice computes
(
gbc
)a
= gabc.
8. Bob computes (gca)
b
= gabc
9. Carol computes
(
gab
)c
= gabc.
It is of course assumed that Eve is party to all communication. We have made a
slight break with convention, simply in order to test the formalism, and assumed
that for whatever reason, Carol is not party to the communications between Alice
and Bob, etc.
The Algebraic-Epistemic diagram for this is given in Figure 16, and – should
it be needed – a step-by-step description of how this diagram is derived is given
in Appendix B. It may be verified that this diagram satisfies the IFO condition,
and it is also unambiguous who has communicated what information to whom.
Fig. 5. Algebraic-Epistemic diagram for
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman
Zp
( )c,{C}

Zp
( )b,{B}

Zp
( )b,{B}
>>
( )c,{C}
**
( )a,{A}
oo
Zp
( )a,{A}

{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gab],{B,C,E}
  
[gb],{B,C,E}
HH
[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
[gc],{C,A,E}
99
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
( )a,{A}
~~
Zp
( )c,{C}
// Zp
Zp
( )b,{B}
jj
An obvious alternative to three participants calculating a single shared secret
is the scenario where each pair of participants has a distinct shared secret via
the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Definition 7. (The
(
3
2
)
Diffie Hellman protocol) We again assume partic-
ipants {Alice,Bob, Carol, Eve} where Eve is the evesdropper. Alice, Bob and
Carol choose private keys a, b, c ∈ Zp, and each pair, Alice-Bob, Bob-Carol, and
Carol-Alice uses the bipartite D-H protocol to construct a shared secret.
– Alice, Bob, and Carol compute ga and gb and gc respectively. They publicly
announce their results.
– Alice computes gba (shared with Bob) and gca (shared with Carol).
– Bob computes gcb (shared with Carol) and gab (shared with Alice).
– Carol computes gac (shared with Alice) and gbc (shared with Bob).
We jump straight to the A-E diagram for the above protocol, given in Figure 6.
This uses the same colour-coding as above.
Fig. 6.
(
3
2
)
Diffie-Hellman
Zp Zp
( )c,{C}

( )a,{A}
oo
Zp
( )c,{C}

( )b,{B}
88
Zp
( )b,{B}
88
( )c,{C}

( )a,{A}
oo
{∗}
[gab],{A,B}
OO
[gca],{C,A}
xx
[gbc],{B,C}
//
g,>
CC
[ga],>
[[
[gc],>
&&
[gb],>
>>
Zp
Zp Zp
( )a,{A}
oo
( )b,{B}
88
Remark 6 (Ordering of steps in tripartite Diffie-Hellman). A notable difference
between the step-by-step descriptions of Definitions 6 and 7, and the A-E dia-
gram of Figures 16 and 6, is that in the tabular description the order of steps is
fixed. In the categorical diagrams, it becomes clear how this particular ordering
of steps is not essential; rather, the only real restrictions are that a participant
can only communicate a value after she has calculated it, and a value can only
be calculated once the pre-requisites for this calculation have been received.
Based on the diagram we may consider alternative orderings of the steps
given in Definition 6; it may be verified that these correspond to alternative, but
operationally equivalent, presentations multipartite Diffie-Hellman protocols.
6 A-E Diagrams as graphical tools for protocols
Although a diagrammatic approach may give a path to intuitive descriptions of
protocols via pictures, we also wish to show how these pictures provide concrete
tools for deducing & reasoning about information flow.
A diagrammatic calculus allows us easily to answer certain questions such as,
‘how much information does a given participant have?’, ‘what are the routes by
which an evesdropper may become aware of a given secret?’, and ‘what are the
consequences of this particular value becoming known?’. We first illustrate this
using various forms of Diffe-Hellman key exchange, then give general techniques
for finding implicit or hidden information via diagrams.
6.1 Manipulating A-E diagrams
We make some straightforward definitions that will have useful interpretations
when applied to A-E diagrams. A key concept is ordering categorical diagrams.
Definition 8. Let (C,≤) be a poset-enriched category, and let H,K be diagrams
(not necessarily commutative) over C. We say H ≤ K iff the underlying directed
graph of H is a subgraph2 of the underlying digraph of K, and for all edges of
H, the label in H is less than or equal to the label of the same edge in K. It is
immediate that this a partial order on diagrams over C.
The above is of course applicable to IFO diagrams. Of particular interest is
the poset of IFO diagrams that are above an arbitrary diagram, and whether
this poset has a bottom element. In general there may not be a unique minimal
IFO diagram above an arbitrary diagram.
6.2 Participants’ views of protocols
A natural example of the ordering of diagrams is given by taking the A-E diagram
for a given protocol, and erasing all edges whose ‘tag’ does not include some
participant, or set of participants.
In Figure 7, we consider the A-E diagram for the
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman protocol,
given in Figure 16, and do this for for the subsets {A}, {A,B}, {A,B,C} and
{E}. This gives a convenient graphical illustration of the information available to
Alice, Alice and Bob, Alice and Bob and Carol, and the evesdropper respectively.
It is immediate that these subdiagrams also satisfy the IFO condition, and
similarly that taking any A-E diagram satisfying the IFO condition, and erasing
all edges according to a simlar criterion, will result in a diagram that again
satisfies the IFO condtion. In particular, it is simple to take the diagram of Figure
6 and erase all edges not accessible to some (non-evesdropper) participant, to
recover the A-E diagram for bipartite D-H key exchange given in Figure 1.
6.3 Updating A-E diagrams based on additional information
We now consider the more interesting case of when a diagram is modified to
reflect some additional information. The resulting diagram may fail to satisfy
the IFO condition.
Under these circumstances, the partial ordering of diagrams becomes a useful
practical tool: given a diagram D that does not satisfy the IFO condition, we
2 We assume an implicit, fixed, embedding in order not to have to consider the graph
embedding or graph isomorphism problem. In practice, this embedding is immediate
from the interpretation
Fig. 7.
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman as seen by various sets of participants
Alice: The {A} restriction Alice & Bob: The {A,B} restriction
Zp
Zp Zp
( )a,{A}
oo
Zp
( )a,{A}

{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
[gc],{C,A,E}
99
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
( )a,{A}
~~
Zp Zp
Zp
Zp
Zp Zp
Zp
{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
Zp Zp
Zp
Alice, Bob & Carol: The {A,B,C} restriction Eve: The {E} restriction
Zp
Zp Zp
Zp
{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[g],>
OO
Zp
Zp Zp
Zp
Zp
Zp Zp
Zp
{∗}
[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gab],{B,C,E}
  
[gb],{B,C,E}
HH
[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
[gc],{C,A,E}
99
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
Zp Zp
consider the poset of diagrams above it that do satisfy this condition. Under
very light assumptions, this will have a bottom element — we may analyse this
to establish the consequences of this additional information.
This is best illustrated by a somewhat trivial example; we take both the
(
3
3
)
and the
(
3
2
)
Diffie-Hellman protocols and update them both with some additional
information: Eve has become aware of the private key of one of the
participants.
To analyse the
(
3
3
)
protocol, we modify the diagram of Figure 16 to replace
every ocurrence of ( )a, {A} by ( )a, {A,E}. This will result in the diagram on
the lhs of Figure 8.
Fig. 8. Eve knows Alice’s private key!
Replacing ( )a, {A} by ( )a, {A,E} The unique smallest IFO diagram above this.
Zp
( )c,{C}

Zp
( )b,{B}

Zp
( )b,{B}
>>
( )c,{C}
**
( )a,{A,E}
oo
Zp
( )a,{A,E}

{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gab],{B,C,E}
  
[gb],{B,C,E}
HH
[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
[gc],{C,A,E}
99
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
( )a,{A,E}
~~
Zp
( )c,{C}
// Zp
Zp
( )b,{B}
jj
Zp
( )c,{C}

Zp
( )b,{B}

Zp
( )b,{B}
>>
( )c,{C}
**
( )a,{A,E}
oo
Zp
( )a,{A,E}

{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C,E}

[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gab],{B,C,E}
  
[gb],{B,C,E}
HH
[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
[gc],{C,A,E}
99
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
( )a,{A,E}
~~
Zp
( )c,{C}
// Zp
Zp
( )b,{B}
jj
This diagram does not satisfy the IFO condition; it is missing either some
communication or some route to participants calculating a given value. Fortu-
nately, the poset of IFO diagrams above this has a smallest element: given on
the rhs of Figure 8.
This particular case is straightforward; the lhs diagram has failed to satisfy
the IFO condition because of the following single subdiagram:
{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
Zp
( )a,{A,E}
~~
Zp
whereas the smallest IFO diagram above this is given by replacing the edge la-
belled
[
gabc
]
, {A,B,C} with an edge labelled by [gabc] , {A,B,C,E}. This single
change corresponds to the observation that Eve now has a route to calculating
Alice, Bob and Carol’s shared secret.
By contrast, let us now assume that Eve is in fact aware of Bob’s secret key
in the
(
3
2
)
version of D-H key exchange. We modify the diagram of Figure 6 to
take this into account; we replace each ocurrence of ( )b, {B} by ( )b, {B,E} and
find the minimal A-E above the result. This gives the diagram of Part (i) of
Figure 9. Using the techniques of Section 6.2, we then consider Eve’s view of the
result, giving part (ii) of Figure 9. It is clear from the diagrams that Eve now
Fig. 9. When Eve knows Bob’s private key
Part (i) Part (ii)
Zp Zp
( )c,{C}

( )a,{A}
oo Zp Zp
Zp
( )c,{C}

( )b,{B,E}
66
Zp
( )b,{B,E}
88
( )c,{C}

( )a,{A}
oo Zp
( )b,{B,E}
66
Zp
( )b,{B,E}
88
{∗}
[gab],{A,B,E}
OO
[gca],{C,A}
vv
[gbc],{B,C,E}
//
g,>
CC
[ga],>
]]
[gc],>
&&
[gb],>
>>
Zp {∗}
[gab],{A,B,E}
OO
[gbc],{B,C,E}
//
g,>
CC
[ga],>
]]
[gc],>
&&
[gb],>
>>
Zp
Zp Zp
( )a,{A}
oo
( )b,{B,E}
88
Zp Zp
( )b,{B,E}
88
has knowledge of the shared secrets of Alice & Bob, and Bob & Carol. However,
she is not able to discover the shared secret of Alice & Carol.
Remark 7. Both the above results are course utterly trivial to anyone even
slightly familiar with Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The intention is to demon-
strate the reliability of the formalism, before moving on to demonstrate its utility.
7 Ambiguity, incompleteness, and algorithmics
In the above diagrammatic manipulations, information about which participant
has made a particular announcement is not explicitly included in the A-E di-
agram for a protocol; this is as described in Section 2.3. A key point of this
formalism is that it nevertheless may be deduced from the context.
We now move on to situations where we have ambiguous or incomplete infor-
mation. This is not relevant for analysing existing protocols, which are of course
carefully designed to avoid ambiguity, and more applicable to real-world situa-
tions involving partial information about public and private communications.
Definition 9. Let D be a diagram satisfying the IFO condition. We say that D
is triangulated when every non-identity 2-cell is decomposed into composites
of identity two-cells, and non-identity two-cells whose source is a path of length
two and whose target is a single edge, such as:
• //
#
•
•
OO ??
We say that a triangulation of a diagram D is a triangulated diagram T with
the same nodes as D, that contains D as a sub-diagram.
No ambiguity can exist about communication / announcements in a triangulated
diagram (beyond the inherent ambiguities given in the original data, such as,
‘Both A and B know the values x and y; one of them subsequently announces the
composite xy.’). Weaker conditions often suffice to avoid ambiguity. However, for
algorithmic purposes the notion of forming triangulations of a given diagram is
useful.
Consider the situation described by the following diagram:
•
c,P3
•
b,P2
??
•
d,P4
•
a,P1
OO
dcba,>
// •
It is of course inaccurate to declare that, based on the information represented
in this diagram, some individual or collection of individuals, in
∧4
j=1 Pj must
have publicly announced the result of the composition dcba. A counterexample
is given by taking P1 = {V,W}, P2 = {W,X}, P3 = {X,Y }, and P4 = {Y,Z},
so
∧4
j=1 Pj = ⊥.
Instead, it is clear that when analysing who has shared what information
with whom, we require additional edges in that diagram that provide additional
epistemic data but do not add anything to the underlying algebraic structure.
Diagrams D1 and D2 below give two possible ways in which the composite
dcba came to be public knowledge:
D1 • b,P2 // • c,P3 //
dc,>

•
d,P4

•
c,P3

D2
•
b,P2
@@
cb,> // •
d,P4
•
a,P1
OO
dcba,>
//
ba,>
GG
• •
a,P1
OO
dcba,>
// •
DiagramD1 is triangulated; we see thatW has publicly announced the composite
ba and Z has publicly announced dc, resulting in any participant being able to
compute dcba.
However,D2 is still not triangulated; although we can see that X has publicly
announced cb there still remains some ambiguity about how dcba came to be
public knowledge.
To resolve the ambiguity in D2, note that it is a sub-diagram of both the
following triangulated diagrams:
D3 •
c,P3

•
c,P3

D4
•
b,P2
@@
cb,> // •
d,P4

•
b,P2
@@
cb,> //
dcb,>
''
•
d,P4
•
a,P1
OO
dcba,>
//
cba,>
77
• •
a,P1
OO
dcba,>
// •
In D3, we see that either V or W has announced cba, then either Y or Z has
announced dcba. Alternatively, in D4, we see that either Y or Z has announced
dca followed by either U or V announcing dcba.
The diagrams D1,D3,D4 are of course not the only routes by which dcba
may have come to be public knowledge. The two remaining possibilities are left
as a straightforward exercise. In general, it is a simple, and easily automated,
task to take an A-E diagram and derive the possible ways (if any!) in which
communications amongst the participants which may have lead to this situation.
Remark 8. We should be aware that simply drawing such diagrams reflects our
own epistemic beliefs; when we tag an edge with the pair (x, {U, V }) we are mak-
ing the assumption that, for example, neither U nor V has publicly announced
the value x. Triangulating a diagram is a method of making deductions about
what actions participants may have taken, based on a priori assumptions.
For deducing additional information of which we are not aware (e.g. partic-
ipant U has communicated the value of x to another participant W ), we must
combine the above notion of triangulating diagrams with the tools derived from
considering the poset of diagrams above or below a given diagram.
8 Comparisons & interactions with other diagrammatic
tools
The intention throughout has been to develop tools that are complementary,
rather than competitive, to other graphical or categorical approaches to secu-
rity. The objective has been deliberately restricted to the setting where we take
the ‘retrospective’ view described in Section 2.3, and use this to reconstruct
information flow – considered generally as both communication, and routes to
calculating values. One perspective is that we are trying to reconstruct, from
minimal information, the starting point of a model such as [4] that deals with
notions of ‘sites’, ‘channels’, and ‘connections’.
From this viewpoint, it is worthwhile analysing similarities and differences,
and potential interactions with other related tools and formalisms. We consider
categorical and graphical settings seperately, although there is of course signifi-
cant overlap between the two.
The closest approach to this current paper – from both a categorical and
a graphical viewpoint – is undoubtedly D. Pavlovic’s work ‘Chasing diagrams
in cryptography’ [15]. The categorical technique of replacing equations by com-
muting diagrams is both widespread & powerful, and any category theorist who
considers a cryptographic question would naturally start by drawing such dia-
grams (whether or not they made it into the final work).
The most substantial difference is that [15] uses such diagrammatics to reason
about (for example) the difficulty of the underlying algebraic problems on which
security is based, and (entirely appropriately for this question), the communi-
cation between participants and paths they take to solve problems are explicit
from the beginning. It is not hard to imagine some synthesis of his approach
and ours, but considering the algebraic problems that must be solved by an at-
tacker would require revisiting the motivation of Footnote 1, that the distinction
between a participant and an adversary is sometimes not all that clear.
It is also worth noticing that our notion of ‘a route to calculating a significant
value’ is entirely binary, and something that an participant either does, or does
not have. In the long term, this needs to become a more fine-grained notion, and
the route to calculating a value must be quantified in terms of its cost in terms
of time or resources – something else that is a key concept of [15].
A significant precursor to much modern category theory in security is C.
O’Halloran’s 1994 DPhil. Thesis, ”Category Theory Applied to Information Flow
for Computer Security” [14]. This brings in yet another strand of category the-
ory into the security world, by finding interpretations of core concepts such as
freeness and universal properties. Although not immediately related, it is surely
indirectly connected to both this current paper and other category-theoretic
works in the field, and is definitely worth revisiting in light of more modern
developments in category theory & security.
A particular curiosity is that categorical/graphical methods seem more firmly
established with regard to quantum-mechanical, rather than classical, protocols.
The starting point for this is undoubtedly the ‘string diagrams’ of Abramsky &
Coecke’s ‘A categorical semantics for quantum protocols’ [2], along with a great
deal of subsequent work. These ‘quantum protocols’ certainly include crypto-
graphic protocols3
The use of graphical, rather than specifically categorical, methods in security
is much better-established. It is therefore not possible to give a complete account,
but it is still worthwhile to give an overview of particularly popular or similar
approaches. One of the best-established must be the notion of ‘Attack Trees’ [18]
or ‘Threat Trees’ [3]. At first sight, these appear completely orthogonal to the
approach we take – they are decidedly goal-oriented, and provide a systematic
route achieving this goal by splitting it up into smaller steps, then subdividing
these, etc. This appears to be in stark contrast to our approach where we have
not even specified a goal – rather, we take a retrospective view of ‘who knows
what’, and attempt to deduce all possible paths by which this may have occurred.
However, taking a more goal-oriented view may become essential as we at-
tempt to scale to larger problems. In a real-world setting, we are unlikely to be
interested in all the details of all possible scenarios that lead to some A-E dia-
gram; instead we would wish to concentrate on some subset of paths that lead
to (for example) a crucial shared secret becoming public knowledge. In the long
term, this will require a hierarchical approach, and systematic ways of mapping
from models of systems to models of threats such as [9].
Another notable feature of attack trees is that it is commonly to label non-
leaf nodes with logical operators – conjunction when all subtasks are required in
order to achieve a goal, or disjunction when any single one of them will suffice.
This is of course a blunt tool that fails to take into account the cost of achieving
a sub-goal, or questions of concurrency & parallelism. A more sophisticated
approach is given by considering resource-sensitive logics, such as variations on
linear logic [8]. More fundamentally, [6] describes attack trees themselves as
formulæ of a form of linear logic, and the notion of specialisation as a form of
linear implication.
At this stage, we are left in the rather unsatisfactory situation of having a
close connection between models, with no similarly obvious connection between
what they model. The categorical models of quantum protocols given in [2]are
directly based on categorical models of linear logic (precisely, the multiplicative-
exponential fragment from Girard’s Geometry of Interaction program [7]) found
in [1]. This current paper also acknowledges its origins in categorical models of
linear logic, although the connection is not as direct.
It is perhaps worth observing that the boolean lattice ordering of participants
used throughout this paper is of course a model of a very primitive (boolean)
logic, and the crucial partial ordering is the implication of this logic. The con-
nection is likely to become clearer when a more sophisticated notion of labeling
and implication is used.
3 I would like to thank various members of the Oxford school for the folklore that
the ‘classical communication’ in these protocols – although often implicit – should
properly be thought of as 2-categorical structure. It is pleasing to be able to claim
that the same applies to implicit communication in classical protocols!
9 Future directions
Although it is visually appealing to be able to draw A-E diagarms for protocols,
the intention is also to develop concrete tools. We have taken the view that
they must first be shown to be well-founded, which is why this is a purely
theoretical paper. The next question is whether they are both accurate and
useful. So far, we have demonstrated that they give the expected (& indeed, well-
established) answer to questions we may pose about communication involving
D-H key exchange & other simple protocols.
The next step must be to apply the formalism & tools developed to a wider
range of more complex situations, arising from real-world examples, as a step
towards validation. Anything but the simplest cases involve non-trivial algo-
rithmics, so a key part of this will involve automating the types of deductions
illustrated in this paper, which is work in progress. As our tools are designed
for deriving implicit knowledge from incomplete information, testing them on
real-world examples seems an essential next step.
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A A-E diagrams from non-commutative cryptography
Although this paper uses various forms of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as il-
lustrative examples, we emphasise that the techniques are entirely general. To
this end, we take a brief diversion, and present A-E diagrams for a family of
significantly different cryptographic protocols, from the general field of non-
commutative cryptography.
We do this in order to point out how the techniques for constructing A-E
diagrams, their interpretation in terms of information flow, and the correctness
criterion, are equally valid in different settings.
A general prescription for public-key protocols in non-commutative cryptog-
raphy is that of Commuting Action Key Exchange (CAKE), introduced in [19].
Many familiar examples arise from this general prescription. In [19], the follow-
ing particular form establishes a shared secret (a member of a given monoid)
between the usual two parties, Alice and Bob, as follows:
Definition 10 (The semigroup CAKE protocol). Given a monoid M , Al-
ice and Bob may come to share a private element σ ∈M via public communi-
cation as follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on two subsets A,B ⊆ S (their respective key pools)
that point-wise commute i.e. ab = ba for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
2. A fixed root element γ ∈ S is agreed upon.
3. Alice chooses her private key, a pair of elements α1, α2 ∈ A, and publicly
broadcasts α1γα2
4. Bob chooses his private key, a pair of elements β1, β2 ∈ B, and publicly
broadcasts β1γβ2.
5. Alice then computes α1β1γβ2α2 and Bob computes β1α1γα2β2. By the point-
wise commutativity of A,B ⊆ S, these are equal, giving Alice and Bob’s
shared secret as σ = α1β1γβ2α2 = β1α1γα2β2.
The traditional evesdropper Eve is assumed to be party to all communications.
We treat the monoid M as a category in the usual way, and denote its unique
object by • ∈ Ob(M). The A-E diagram over M×2{A,B,E} for the CAKE family
of protocols is given in Figure 10.
Fig. 10. The Algebraic-Epistemic diagram for semigroup CAKE
•
α2,{A}
ww
σ,{A,B} //
β2,{B}
•
•
β2,{B}

PB ,> //

•
α1,{A}
77
•
α2,{A}
ww
PA,> // •
β1,{B}
^^
• γ,> // •
α1,{A}
77
β1,{B}
^^
It is straightforward to verify that the A-E diagram of Figure 10 satisfies
the IFO condition. The non-trivial 2-categorical information (i.e. the two-cells
filled in with inequalities) illustrates both public announcements (Figure 11) and
distinct routes to calculating the same value (Figure 12).
Remark 9 (For category-theorists ...). The CAKE family of protocols highlights
another, more mysterious, connection between category theory and cryptogra-
phy. The first algebraic platform proposed, in [20], for this family of protocols
was Thompson’s group F . It is by now well-known that Thompson’s F is pre-
cisely the group of canonical associativity isomorphisms for a (semi-)monoidal
tensor on a monoid, and hence the commuting diagrams representing the alge-
bra of this protocol are canonical diagrams in the sense of MacLane’s theory of
Fig. 11. Alice and Bob’s public CAKE announcements
•
β2,{B}

PB ,> // •
•
α2,{A}
ww
PA,> // •
• γ,> // •
α1,{A}
77
β1,{B}
^^
Fig. 12. Distinct paths to the same result in CAKE
•
α2,{A}
ww
σ,{A,B} //
β2,{B}
•
• PB ,{A,B,E} //

•
α1,{A}
77
• PA,{A,B,E} // •
β1,{B}
^^
coherence for associativity [10]. It would be hard to overstate the importance of
such diagrams in the foundations of category theory! Even though the protocol of
[20] is well-known to be insecure [11,17], the question remains as to whether this
is simply a spectacular coincidence, or an indication of some deeper connection.
B Step-by-step construction of A-E diagrams for
(
3
3
)
DH
In Section 5, the A-E diagram for the
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman protocol is presented
with no indication as to how it was derived. We now give a step-by-step descrip-
tion of the construction of the A-E diagram for the above protocol. The algebraic
core is the identity ( )abc = ( )bca = ( )cab, which we draw as the commuting
diagram of Figure 13. The protocol itself relies on these equalities when applied
to a specific root element g ∈ Z, so we introduce the singleton object {∗} and
the element maps [g], [gabc] : {∗} → Zp, giving the commuting diagram of Figure
14:
The elements ga, gab, gb, gbc, gc, gca also play an explicit part in the proto-
col, so we add in the appropriate arrows from the central point to the outer
corners of each vertical rectangle, to give the commuting diagram of Figure 15
that describes the interaction of all algebraic entities in
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman key
exchange.
It finally remains to add in the epistemic data. This is routine, given that
1. only Alice (resp. Bob, resp. Carol) can perform ( )a (resp. ( )b, resp. ( )c).
Fig. 13. The algebraic core of
(
3
3
)
D-H key exchange
Zp
( )c

Zp
( )b

Zp
( )b
>>
( )c
''
( )aoo
Zp
( )a
~~
Zp
( )a

Zp ( )c // Zp
Zp
( )b
gg
Fig. 14. The algebra of
(
3
3
)
D-H, applied to a root element
Zp
( )c

Zp
( )b

Zp
( )b
EE
( )c
((
( )a
oo
Zp
( )a

{∗}
[gabc]

[g]
OO
Zp
( )a
~~
Zp ( )c // Zp
Zp
( )b
hh
Fig. 15. All the algebraic entities of
(
3
3
)
D-H key exchange
Zp
( )c

Zp
( )b

Zp
( )b
>>
( )c
**
( )a
oo
Zp
( )a

{∗}
[gabc]

[g]
OO
[ga]
cc
[gab]
{{
[gb]
GG
[gbc]
&&
[gc]
55
[gca]

Zp
( )a
xx
Zp ( )c // Zp
Zp
( )b
jj
2. Except for the computations in the bottom triangle,
– Alice communicates the results of all her computations to Bob,
– Bob communicates the results of all his computations to Carol,
– Carol communicates the results of all her computations to Alice.
3. Eve is aware of the results of all communications.
Adding in this information gives the Algebraic-Epistemic diagram of Figure 16;
it may be verified that this diagram satisfies the IFO condition, and it is also
unambiguous who has communicated what information to whom.
Remark 10 (Generalising to arbitrary numbers of participants). It is notable that
the diagram of Figure 16 consists of three isomorphic diagrams pasted along a
common edge, with these three diagrams being related by a cyclic permutation of
the symbols (A, a), (B, b) and (C, c). This clearly generalises to a higher number
of participants.
C Diagrammatics for the
(
4
2
)
Diffie Hellman protocol
As an exercise in diagrammatics, we extend the diagrams of Section 5 to the case
where there are four participants, and each pair of them establishes a shared
secret – i.e. the
(
4
2
)
D-H key exchange protocol.
Fig. 16. Algebraic-Epistemic diagram for
(
3
3
)
Diffie-Hellman
Zp
( )c,{C}

Zp
( )b,{B}

Zp
( )b,{B}
>>
( )c,{C}
**
( )a,{A}
oo
Zp
( )a,{A}

{∗}
[gabc],{A,B,C}

[g],>
OO
[ga],{A,B,E}
^^
[gab],{B,C,E}
  
[gb],{B,C,E}
HH
[gbc],{C,A,E}
&&
[gc],{C,A,E}
99
[gca],{A,B,E}

Zp
( )a,{A}
~~
Zp
( )c,{C}
// Zp
Zp
( )b,{B}
jj
Definition 11. (The
(
4
2
)
Diffie Hellman protocol) We assume participants
{Alice,Bob, Carol,Dave,Eve} where Eve is the evesdropper. Alice, Bob, Carol,
and Dave each choose private keys a, b, c, d ∈ Zp, and each pair uses the pair-wise
Diffie-Hellman protocol to construct a shared secret.
As a starting point to drawing the A-E diagram for this protocol, let us
adopt yet another colour-coding convention, and denote operations applied by
each participant by a consistent colour. Each participant then applies the ‘ex-
ponentiation by their private key’ on four different occasions, as illustrated in
Figure 17. Recalling commutativity of modular exponentiation operations (i.e.
Fig. 17. Each participant applies their secret operation four times
gac
gad ga ( )b //
( )c
OO
( )doo gab
gda gba
gdb gd
( )a
OO
( )boo
( )c

g
( )a
OO
( )b //
( )c

( )doo gb
( )a
OO
( )c

( )d // gbd
gdc gbc
gcd gc
( )a

( )b //( )doo gcb
gca
(
gb
)c
= (gc)
b
, &c.), we observe that a total of six distinct private keys are
calculated, each one in two different ways.
Let us now take the graph of Figure 17 and identify nodes that have the
same value (e.g. the top gca and the bottom gac). We may draw the resulting
figure as a regular three-dimensional figure where all lines have equal length,
and all edges with the same colour are parallel. As these identifications are valid
regardless of the value of the root g ∈ Zp, we have replaced the individual values
by the object Zp. We have also added in the epistemic operation – this step is
trivial, since as each operation shown(i.e. exponentiation by a private key) this
may only be performed by the respective owner. We derive the (commuting)
diagram of Figure 18.
Fig. 18. Exponentiation by a private key, performed by its owner
Zp
( )d,{D}
tt
( )b,{B}
**
( )c,{C}

Zp Zp
Zp Zp
( )a,{A}
VV
( )b,{B}
**
( )d,{D}
tt ( )
c,{C}
		
Zp
( )a,{A}
VV
( )c,{C}
		
( )b,{B}
**
Zp
( )a,{A}
VV
( )c,{C}
		
( )d,{D}
ttZp
Zp
( )d,{D}
tt
( )b,{B}
**
( )a,{A}
UU
Zp Zp
Note that this diagram does indeed commute – there are no non-trivial 2-
cells. The composite along any two paths with the same source and target is of
the form ( )s, {}, for some shared secret s ∈ Zp. This emphasises that no single
individual is able to calculate a shared secret without a public announcement
from another participant! Adding in the key singleton object, and the respective
‘select an element’ arrows will provide for non-trivial 2-cells, and hence models
of knowledge & information flow.
Unfortunately, three spacial dimensions do not suffice for drawing this as a
regular shape; we therefore adopt the following simplifications in order to make
our diagram manageable:
– As both the algebraic and epistemic labels on the coloured edges are uniquely
determined by the colour, we omit these labels in favour of the colour-coding
only.
– The ‘select an element’ arrows are drawn as dotted lines, with no attempt
made to distinguish over- and under- crossings.
– The unique singleton element is represented by a bullet • = {∗}.
This then leads to the diagram shown in Figure 19, which may be verified to
satisfy the IFO condition.
Fig. 19. The A-E diagram for
(
4
2
)
Diffie-Hellman
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Remark 11 (Combinatorics, diagrams, and polyhedra for
(
n
k
)
Diffie-Hellman).
Combinatorially, it is relatively easy to write down an abstract characterisa-
tion – in terms of nodes, edges, and labels – of the A-E diagram for the
(
n
k
)
Diffie-Hellman protocol, where there are n participants, and every subgroup of
k individuals comes to share a secret. What is less intuitive is the description
of these diagrams in terms of regular figures in d-dimensional space. A suitable
geometric characterisation surely exists, although it is far from the stated aims
of this paper! It is therefore left as a potentially non-trivial exercise.
